THE debate about the creation of new provinces remains alive. Shahbaz Sharif`s remarks about looking towards Karachi in Sindh rather than the Saraiki in Punjab regarding this agenda led to a severe backlash from the MQM and PPP.
In Punjab, the ethnic mix has kept the whole issue of creating the new Saraiki province on the back burner. The first-wave migrants, i.e. settlers in the newly opened canal irrigation colonies were joined by the second-wave migrants of partition mainly from Punjabi but also non-Punjabi stock. The situation was further complicated by rivalry between Bahawalpur — the princely state in British India that enjoyed a `provincial` status after partition — and Multan, the classical hub of the regional culture and language.
The project of the Saraiki province remains mired in controversy. Students and intellectuals have generally taken the lead in mobilising for a separate entity. But the political leadership of southern Punjab has traditionally looked towards Lahore rather than Multan as the symbol and focus of their ambition for power. Settlers and migrants favour mainstream Punjab and thus the PML-N leadership, while `locals` who uphold the cause of Seraiki are partisans of the PPP. Some Mohajir strongholds in areas such as Rahim Yar Khan represent a spillover from the adjoining areas of Sindh.
The demographic complexity without a corresponding level of political mobilisation has led to status quo in different provinces. There is the additional requirement for a constitutional amendment to create new provinces, in the absence of a consensus on this issue. While the PPP and PML-Q have formally agreed to pursue the agenda for the Hazara and Seraiki provinces, it is difficult to predict any significant progress in this direction in the near future.
The ethnic communities of Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were incensed at the non-recognition of their community rights and the lack of provincial autonomy. The 1973 constitution ushered in the era of recognition of the `majority` communities of the `minority` provinces as flag-bearers of their respective nationalisms. While these communities developed stakes in the preservation of the classical boundaries of their provinces, the respective `minority` communities became restive under the new scheme of things.
In addition to the centralist army and bureaucracy, ethnic leaderships have been befuddled by the complexities of the situation on the ground that hampered their agenda for provincial reorganisation. For example, the Pakhtun leadership would not take up the issue on a linguistic basis because of a sizeable community of Hindko-speaking people living in their province, not only in the Hazara division but also in the heart of the province — the Peshawar valley. Any attempt at reorganising the province would reduce the size of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This is anathema to Pakhtun nationalists.
Two areas of Pakhtun concentration outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that could have boosted the strength of its core community, i.e. Fata and the Pakhtun belt of Balochistan, remained hostile to their amalgamation with that province. Especially Fata`s illusory gain as an autonomous region proved to be a net loss to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in terms of demography, strategic importance and an enhanced status in the federation.
The Baloch leadership has been similarly shy about the agenda of reshaping their province on a linguistic basis that would mean the loss of a large chunk of northern Balochistan populated by Pakhtuns. Furthermore, the Brahvi-speaking people of the Mengal tribe can pose a problem in the event of the political mobilisation of language, threatening a further cut in the size of the province. In this way, Balochistan stands to lose considerable territory and population. This would further marginalise it in the national scheme of things.
Sindh remains a confusing case for the agenda of creating new provinces. On the one hand, it is the `sacred` homeland of Sindhis who would not like to see it vivisected. On the other hand, the ethno-linguistic divide between Sindhis and Mohajirs is deeply embedded in the political imagination of the two communities. The movement for a separate Karachi province has been simmering under the surface for four decades. But, geographical and demographic dimensions of the issue pose a daunting challenge to the MQM leadership.
There are Mohajirs living in Karachi as well as in the rest of urban Sindh. A Karachi province would destabilise millions of Mohajirs of the second category who would thus be stranded on the wrong side of a bloody line across the map of the province. They would be obliged to seek shelter in the new province in the wake of ethnic riots. Similarly, non-Mohajirs in Karachi would be rendered clueless and insecure, some even considering migration in the reverse direction. The perspective of a replay of the 1947 partition poses a horrendous challenge to the political leadership in Sindh.
Meanwhile, the Sindhi elite has developed considerable stakes in Karachi. Previously, one heard some Sindhi voices in favour of `giving` Karachi to the Mohajirs and thus securing the rest of the province for their community, along with access to a seaport through Malir. However, Sindhis have made inroads into the bureaucracy and strengthened their pockets of support in the city. Meanwhile, the ANP has posed a new challenge to the erstwhile control of the MQM over the city. Sindhis` hopes for a shared space in the city have been rekindled.
In Punjab, the ethnic mix has kept the whole issue of creating the new Saraiki province on the back burner. The first-wave migrants, i.e. settlers in the newly opened canal irrigation colonies were joined by the second-wave migrants of partition mainly from Punjabi but also non-Punjabi stock. The situation was further complicated by rivalry between Bahawalpur — the princely state in British India that enjoyed a `provincial` status after partition — and Multan, the classical hub of the regional culture and language.
The project of the Saraiki province remains mired in controversy. Students and intellectuals have generally taken the lead in mobilising for a separate entity. But the political leadership of southern Punjab has traditionally looked towards Lahore rather than Multan as the symbol and focus of their ambition for power. Settlers and migrants favour mainstream Punjab and thus the PML-N leadership, while `locals` who uphold the cause of Seraiki are partisans of the PPP. Some Mohajir strongholds in areas such as Rahim Yar Khan represent a spillover from the adjoining areas of Sindh.
The demographic complexity without a corresponding level of political mobilisation has led to status quo in different provinces. There is the additional requirement for a constitutional amendment to create new provinces, in the absence of a consensus on this issue. While the PPP and PML-Q have formally agreed to pursue the agenda for the Hazara and Seraiki provinces, it is difficult to predict any significant progress in this direction in the near future.
Later, the PML-Q was exposed to internal divisions on the issue of creating the Hazara province. Prime Minister Gilani has promised to put the Seraiki province on the agenda after the next elections. After partition, India acknowledged language as a legitimate entity for the political community. It took up the comprehensive project of reorganising the states on a linguistic basis. This removed a major irritant in the way of national integration by redrawing boundaries and thus strengthened the federation.
However, Pakistan condemned the language-based identity of provinces as a recipe for national disintegration. This policy kept ethno-linguistic sentiments alive and weakened the federation. The army and certain right-wing politicians supported proposals for new provinces commensurate with existing administrative units such as divisions, thus cutting across ethnic lines.The ethnic communities of Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were incensed at the non-recognition of their community rights and the lack of provincial autonomy. The 1973 constitution ushered in the era of recognition of the `majority` communities of the `minority` provinces as flag-bearers of their respective nationalisms. While these communities developed stakes in the preservation of the classical boundaries of their provinces, the respective `minority` communities became restive under the new scheme of things.
In addition to the centralist army and bureaucracy, ethnic leaderships have been befuddled by the complexities of the situation on the ground that hampered their agenda for provincial reorganisation. For example, the Pakhtun leadership would not take up the issue on a linguistic basis because of a sizeable community of Hindko-speaking people living in their province, not only in the Hazara division but also in the heart of the province — the Peshawar valley. Any attempt at reorganising the province would reduce the size of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This is anathema to Pakhtun nationalists.
Two areas of Pakhtun concentration outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that could have boosted the strength of its core community, i.e. Fata and the Pakhtun belt of Balochistan, remained hostile to their amalgamation with that province. Especially Fata`s illusory gain as an autonomous region proved to be a net loss to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in terms of demography, strategic importance and an enhanced status in the federation.
The Baloch leadership has been similarly shy about the agenda of reshaping their province on a linguistic basis that would mean the loss of a large chunk of northern Balochistan populated by Pakhtuns. Furthermore, the Brahvi-speaking people of the Mengal tribe can pose a problem in the event of the political mobilisation of language, threatening a further cut in the size of the province. In this way, Balochistan stands to lose considerable territory and population. This would further marginalise it in the national scheme of things.
Sindh remains a confusing case for the agenda of creating new provinces. On the one hand, it is the `sacred` homeland of Sindhis who would not like to see it vivisected. On the other hand, the ethno-linguistic divide between Sindhis and Mohajirs is deeply embedded in the political imagination of the two communities. The movement for a separate Karachi province has been simmering under the surface for four decades. But, geographical and demographic dimensions of the issue pose a daunting challenge to the MQM leadership.
There are Mohajirs living in Karachi as well as in the rest of urban Sindh. A Karachi province would destabilise millions of Mohajirs of the second category who would thus be stranded on the wrong side of a bloody line across the map of the province. They would be obliged to seek shelter in the new province in the wake of ethnic riots. Similarly, non-Mohajirs in Karachi would be rendered clueless and insecure, some even considering migration in the reverse direction. The perspective of a replay of the 1947 partition poses a horrendous challenge to the political leadership in Sindh.
Meanwhile, the Sindhi elite has developed considerable stakes in Karachi. Previously, one heard some Sindhi voices in favour of `giving` Karachi to the Mohajirs and thus securing the rest of the province for their community, along with access to a seaport through Malir. However, Sindhis have made inroads into the bureaucracy and strengthened their pockets of support in the city. Meanwhile, the ANP has posed a new challenge to the erstwhile control of the MQM over the city. Sindhis` hopes for a shared space in the city have been rekindled.